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Rigidity and Modal Asymmetry:
The intuitive Kripkean argument revisited
Michael Oliva Córdoba
Much of what has been discussed in the theory of reference in the last
twenty-five years is strongly influenced by considerations centring on the
business of devising a semantics for quantified modal logic. In this context,
discussion of the property of rigidity plays an important role. This property
is conceived of as a semantic modal property that distinguishes proper
names from descriptions. It is argued that there is a semantic modal asym-
metry between expressions of these types. In this talk I shall challenge this
assumption. By examining the intuitive Kripkean argument or test employed
I arrive at two rather nonconformist results: Firstly, it seems that the test
does not establish a genuine semantic asymmetry: Rigidity appears to be a
pragmatic property. Secondly, the test does not seem to demonstrate an
asymmetry at all: When applied correctly it suggests that both proper names
and descriptions (even discounting notorious cases like “the even prime”)
can be used rigidly—or so I shall argue.
1. Why an argument for the rigidity thesis is needed
As is well known, the notion of rigidity is introduced in Saul Kripke’s lec-
tures Naming and Necessity. There, Kripke states that an expression is a
rigid designator if and only if it designates the same object with respect to
all possible worlds. He then goes on to say: “In these lectures, I will argue,
intuitively, that proper names are rigid designators […]” (Kripke 1980, 48).1
It is easily seen that these statements differ markedly with respect to their
status. The first one is a mere stipulation; it cannot be subjected to criticism
save for methodological reasons alone. The second one contains a substan-
tial claim: it is meant to state that the proper names of natural language are
rigid designators. Since applying such sophisticated technical notions to
natural language expressions does not go without saying it is clear that the
rigidity thesis is in need of justification—the thesis is not justified in itself.
In particular, as Kripke has pointed out himself, the thesis is not simply jus-
tified by the possibility of treating expressions of a formal modal language
in certain ways:
In speaking of rigid designators, we are speaking of a possibility
that certainly exists in a formal modal language. Logically, we
as yet are committed to no thesis about the status of what we or-
dinarily call ‘names’ in natural language. (Kripke 1980, 4)
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If this is correct it seems that a similar line of thought applies to other sub-
stantial notions of a semantics for a formal modal language as well. Hence it
appears that what is called for to establish the rigidity thesis in the first place
is a modally innocent argument.2 Clearly, in order to be effective, such an
argument must not presuppose the applicability of the central notions of a
semantics for quantified modal logic to natural language expressions.
Rather, it has to establish it in its conclusion. It is precisely because he ac-
knowledges this point that Kripke appeals to an intuitive argument to make
the case for the rigidity thesis:
In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names are
rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have
been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been
Nixon (though he might not have been called ‘Nixon’). (Kripke
1980, 49)
This passage is meant to provide the justification we need: it contains the
intuitive argument for the rigidity thesis that is called for. The argument,
which can be conceived of as a test or criterion for an expression’s being
rigid, will be in the focus of attention of the present talk. I shall first give a
reconstruction of it and then go on to comment upon it.
2. The Kripkean argument for the rigidity thesis
Let us start by examining the general structure of the intuitive argument.
Consider, for instance, the following pair of sentences:
(1) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle
(2) Aristotle might not have been the inventor of formal logic
The general form of the test is best outlined by representing it schematically.
It is easily seen that it involves a schema consisting of two modal sentences
whose tokens differ only with respect to one position:
(MS-1) α might not have been α
(MS-2) α might not have been β
What is being tested is the behaviour of two type expressions, represented as
“α” and “β”, in the presence of the natural language modal two-place predi-
cate “might not have been”. The predicate involved provides a modal con-
text with respect to which the behaviour of these expressions is to be evalu-
ated.3 For the sake of convenience, let us call α  the primary test expression
and β  the expression for comparison.
Against this background we may now proceed to reconstruct the crucial
argument. Regarding sentence pairs such as (1)/(2) the Kripkean argument
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for the rigidity thesis may be reconstructed thus: Where the first sentence
contains a repeated occurrence of the proper name “Aristotle” the second
one contains a description that describes the same person named by the
proper name. But apparently (1) and (2) differ in truth-value. For all we
know Plato might have been the inventor of formal logic, had the develop-
ment of philosophy only taken another course. So it seems that (2) is true.
But what about the truth-value of (1)? Could any alternative course of things
have brought it about that someone other than Aristotle is Aristotle? Appar-
ently not. This suggests that we have a semantic difference—a difference in
truth-value—caused by variation within a modal context—the predicate
“might not have been”. Since (1) and (2) differ only with respect to the re-
placement of a proper name with a description describing the same object, it
is sensible to assume that the semantic difference found is caused by a se-
mantic modal difference between the expressions involved, i.e. the descrip-
tion and the proper name. And since these expressions are co-designative it
is tempting to trace this difference back not to a difference with respect to
what they designate but to a difference in the way in which they designate it.
Unlike the description the proper name appears to call for a constant inter-
pretation even in modal contexts like “might not have been”. In other words:
the great philosopher of antiquity is designated ‘rigidly’ by the proper name
but not by the description. So this is the conclusion the Kripkean draws: the
difference in truth-value of sentences like (1) and (2) illustrates that proper
names are modally rigid while descriptions are not.
3. Submitting the intuitive argument to closer inspection
So much for a first approach towards the reconstruction of the intuitive
Kripkean argument. More needs to be said in order to assess whether the
intuitive argument really makes its point. But up to now the line of thought
employed seems quite powerful. Note in particular that it does not presup-
pose the special perspective of a semantics for quantified modal logic.
Rather, it uses that perspective to explain a difference that can be detected
without invoking that perspective beforehand, and this is precisely what is
needed. So the intuitive test seems to make a strong case for the rigidity the-
sis as concerning the semantics of natural language. Actually, it is even hard
to see how an appropriate argument could only be thought to make the case
for this thesis and neither rely on the Kripkean argument nor be a mere vari-
ant of it. Surely some sort of appeal to a semantic difference a modally in-
nocent competent speakers of natural language can detect must be involved.
Other sorts of consideration, e.g. purely metaphysical considerations, can
hardly in themselves succeed in making what is meant to be a semantic
claim.
It is clear that the intuitive argument is the cornerstone of the rigidity the-
sis. Therefore, it would seem bad practice to simply be content with the ar-
gument as it stands. To appeal to intuition to make the case for a given
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claim is a perfectly legitimate move but it is also legitimate, even necessary,
to ask upon what the intuition appealed to might rest. If this question is pur-
sued, however, the result of analysis may be of two sorts: Scrutiny may ei-
ther reveal that the intuition appealed to really does lend support to the the-
sis under consideration or it may reveal that this is not the case. I shall argue
that closer inspection shows that no support for the rigidity thesis can be de-
rived from the intuitive argument. It even lends support to the opposite
claim that proper names and descriptions do not in principle behave differ-
ently in modal contexts. But before turning to this let me briefly safeguard
against some possible misunderstandings of the direction of my critique.
Neither shall I take up Paul Ziff’s (1977, 325-7) point and dispute the truth-
value difference the Kripkean alludes to, nor shall I object like Jason Stan-
ley (1997, 569 & 578) that alluding to it does not refute descriptivism (i.e.
the claim that for every proper name there is a synonymous description).
Both criticisms deserve to be taken seriously but relate rather indirectly to
the considerations of the present talk. Also, the argument spelled out in my
reconstruction should not be confused with the modal argument recently
discussed by Scott Soames (1998, 13–17). The argument Soames is con-
cerned with takes the assumption that proper names are rigid designators as
a premise; by contrast, the intuitive argument sketched above aims at de-
riving this claim as a conclusion. Thus the arguments are quite distinct and
the argument discussed here is conceptually and methodologically prior to
the argument discussed by Soames.4
Given this, it will be clear that the point I am after in this talk is a differ-
ent one. I take as my starting point the assumption that there is a truth-value
difference for the Kripkean to detect. And I shall try to bring to light the
conditions under which that truth-value difference obtains. So I shall be
concerned exclusively with interpretations of utterances that make the case
for the Kripkean truth-value difference. However, given the approach taken
here this involves making explicit the hidden test conditions. One of these
conditions seems to be the requirement that on of the test expressions be
used attributively. Quite generally, it seems that in order for the truth-value
difference the Kripkean detects to occur two requirements must be com-
plied: Firstly, both the primary test expression and the expression for com-
parison must be taken to apply to the same object throughout the utterance;
secondly, one of the expressions involved must be taken to be used referen-
tially and the other must be taken to be used attributively. Otherwise, no
relevant truth-value difference of the sort the Kripkean witnesses seems to
emerge.
Let me start by explaining the need for the first requirement. Both the
primary test expression and the expression for comparison must be taken to
apply to the same object throughout the utterance: If the primary test expres-
sion and the expression for comparison applied to numerically distinct ob-
jects (2) would be false (because of violating the implication carried by (2)
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that the designatum of the one expression is identical with the designatum of
the other.) Moreover, with respect to the primary test expression alone it is
clear that if any resulting truth-value difference is to be relevant it must be
used for the same object wherever a token of it occurs. Someone talking
about Aristotle Onassis in the first sentence and talking about the philoso-
pher in the second could not serve to establish the claim investigated here.
Now it could be thought that this case can be ruled out by making the as-
sumption that every proper name names at most one object. An adherent of
this view would have to insist e.g. that John Smith from, say, Islington and
John Smith from, say, Hackney do not have the same name. However,
Kripke regards such an assumption as a methodological simplification only
(and I fully agree).5 Strictly speaking, therefore, it is a false assumption, and
in order not to make ourselves dependent upon a false assumption we must
demand that both the primary test expression and the expression for com-
parison must be taken to apply to the same object throughout the utterance.
But this alone will not suffice so let me come to the second requirement.
One of the expressions involved must be taken to be used referentially and
the other must be taken to be used attributively: If both the proper name and
the description were used referentially (for the same object, of course)
something wrong would be said with both (1) and (2) it seems and no truth-
value difference Just reconsider (2):
(2) Aristotle might not have been the inventor of formal logic
By the very law of identity, Aristotle is necessarily identical with himself.
However, with respect to the referential use of both the description and the
proper name (2) seems to amount to quite the opposite claim. Therefore, the
primary test expression and the expression for comparison must not both be
used referentially. Apparently, however, they must not both be used attribu-
tively either: It is sometimes said that in using an expression attributively
we are talking about the entity to which the expression “really” applies
(Donnellan 1966, 285). Now the entity to which the proper name really ap-
plies could not have been different from the entity to which the description
really applies since, again, they are one and the same entity. Thus, a truth-
value difference can only result if one of the expressions is used attribu-
tively and the other expression is used referentially, and this is why we need
the second requirement.6
4. The relevance of the referential-attributive distinction
defended
In the light of the foregoing it appears that the test for rigidity has an inti-
mate connection with the referential-attributive distinction. We even ap-
pealed to it to make the case for the Kripkean truth-value difference. Now,
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like Kripke I assume that the referential-attributive distinction is pragmatic
rather than semantic:7 The difference concerns what is communicated by a
certain speaker’s use of an expression rather than what is expressed by the
expression itself, and neither the attributive use nor the referential use of an
expression can be properly understood without taking the speaker’s commu-
nicative intentions into account. Given this we seem to face a certain prob-
lem, though. Kripke wants to make a semantic claim but the reconstruction
offered only provides a basis for a pragmatic claim. Moreover, Kripke ex-
plicitly says that his views in Naming and Necessity have “no special con-
nection with the referential-attributive distinction.” (Kripke 1977, 24). Does
this mean the reconstruction went wrong?
To be sure, on my reconstruction of the argument the semantic difference
is a genuine semantic difference, namely a difference in truth-value. How-
ever, it is not a difference between the propositions expressed by instances
of
(MS-1) α might not have been α
(MS-2) α might not have been β
but a difference between what is communicated by someone using the ex-
pressions to be substituted for “α” and “β” in the way indicated. Can the
Kripkean simply object in the following fashion?
Well and good. You have demonstrated that my test sentences can
be used in a way such that the intuition of there being a truth-value
difference involved is accounted for. However, I was suggesting that
the truth-value difference is a result of what these sentences express.
This rejoinder seems quite inappropriate. It is not enough to assure that the
truth-value difference involved concerns the propositions expressed. We
need a reason for assuming this, especially now that an explanation of the
intuition that there is a truth-value difference has been given. The Kripkean
has to offer an alternative explanation of the intuition underlying the argu-
ment under consideration, and there is only one explanation I can think of
that does not invoke the referential-attributive distinction, namely the appeal
to Russell’s Theory of Descriptions. Due to the scope of the logical opera-
tors involved the Russellian analysis of description sentences gives rise to at
least two different readings of (2):
(1') ◊ ¬  (Aristotle = Aristotle)
(2') ◊ ¬  (∃ x) (Fx & (y) (Fy → y = x) & (x = Aristotle))
(2'') (∃ x) (Fx & (y) (Fy → y = x) & ◊ ¬  (x = Aristotle))
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In the first of these readings, (2) expresses a true proposition, in the second
it does not. Since Aristotle did invent formal logic it is wrong to say “one
and only one person is the inventor of formal logic and it is possible that this
person is not identical with Aristotle”. Thus (2'') is false. But it is surely
possible that it is not the case that one and only one person is an inventor of
formal logic and is identical with Aristotle. For all we know formal logic
might have been invented by Plato. Hence it is possible that the unique in-
ventor of formal logic is not Aristotle. Therefore, (2') is true, and in this
reading of (2) there is a truth-value difference with respect to (1).
If the Kripkean relies on this line of thought, his claim that (1) and (2)
have different truth-value would have to be refined. He would have to say
that there is at least one reading of the test sentences according to which
they differ in truth-value. Note, however, that if the Kripkean relies on this
point to make the case for the truth-value difference he explicitly makes
himself dependent upon the quantificational analysis of descriptions. His
rigidity thesis will only be true if this analysis is correct. Now, Russell’s
analysis is very widespread, perhaps even more widely accepted than
Kripke’s, still I think that we have reason not to make Kripke’s point de-
pendent upon Russell’s. On the one hand, Russell’s analysis might turn out
to be false. On the other hand, Kripke explicitly objects to tracing rigidity
back to scope interaction phenomena in modal contexts. Let me explain.
Of course, this is not the place to recapitulate the old and long contro-
versy about Russell’s theory. Still, let me briefly draw your attention to a
new argument apt show that Russell’s theory is problematic. What is it to be
a description? Russell is very explicit about that being a (definite) descrip-
tion is a matter of grammatical form only.8 But what is the grammatical
form of descriptions? We are usually told little more than that a (definite)
description is “a phrase of the form ‘the so-and-so’ (in the singular)” (Rus-
sell 1910, 205; 1919, 167). Clearly, this does not qualify as an exhaustive
answer—just think of Russell’s own example “my only son” (1905, 47).
Moreover, the restriction to singular expressions is implausible too.9 Does
this mean that Russell’s claim that being a description is a matter of gram-
matical form only is void? Not at all. All things considered, it seems that the
claim can be substantiated independently, namely by taking descriptions to
be determiner phrases in a linguistic sense of the word: functional phrases
of the structure DP → Det NP, whose head is a determiner—e.g. the definite
article—and whose complement is a noun phrase—e.g. a noun.10 On this
interpretation, both phrases like ‘the so-and-so’ and phrases like “my only
son” would count as descriptions: both are determiner phrases. Quite gener-
ally, interpreting descriptions as determiner phrases allows us to show that
all examples that Russell and his followers are prepared to count as descrip-
tions do really qualify as such. (Think, e.g. of Donnellan’s example
“Smith’s murderer”.) So it seems that the Russellian claim that being a de-
scription is a matter of grammatical form only can be plausibly defended
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and even be made more precise: Being a description truly is a matter of
grammatical form (namely a matter of belonging to the functional syntacti-
cal category of determiner phrases).
However, once we accept the unbracketed part of the claim only (let
alone both) we seem to run into serious difficulties. Syntactical form (in the
sense of belonging to a certain syntactical category) is now taken to be deci-
sive, but by parity of syntactical form we are now barred from excluding
demonstrative, plural, mass, or incomplete expressions like “this vase”, “the
men in the yard”, “the gold in Zurich”, and “the table” from the list of de-
scriptions.11 Thus it appears that the Russellian analysis of descriptions has
to give an adequate account of such expressions also. It is doubtful, though,
whether it can really deal with them. Of course, there have been many ef-
forts to integrate descriptions of these kinds into a more general Russellian
analysis but the success of these efforts has been at best partial, leaving open
the question of whether a Russellian analysis can be reconciled with all the
recalcitrant expressions mentioned.12 So it seems that there are both meth-
odological and substantial reasons for not making the correctness of the
Russellian analysis a precondition of the correctness of Kripke’s rigidity
thesis.
Indeed, if we look at Naming and Necessity, such an approach appears to
be quite faithful to Kripke’s original intentions, and this is the second reason
why we should not make Kripke’s rigidity thesis dependent on Russell’s
Theory of Description: In the preface Kripke argues explicitly that his views
do not reduce to alluding to scope interaction phenomena of descriptions in
modal contexts. We may add on his behalf, then, that his views do not rely
on such phenomena either.
Once we take serious the foregoing considerations it seems that we nei-
ther could nor should resort to the Russellian Theory of Descriptions to
make the case for the truth-value difference. Remember, however, that to
detect the truth-value difference is vital for the intuitive Kripkean argument.
So since there does not appear to be a way of reconstructing this truth-value
difference without invoking the referential-attributive distinction it seems
that we have to be content with the reconstruction sketched above. And
since the result of the test thus ultimately rests upon pragmatic features of
the expressions used it seems that rigidity, contrary to what is generally as-
sumed, is best conceived of as a pragmatic property.
5. Applying the Kripkean test in reverse order
It has become clear that rigidity is best accounted for as a pragmatic prop-
erty (of (uses of) expressions) rather than a semantic one. In the remainder
of the talk I shall argue that the test yields an even more surprising result:
proper names and descriptions do not in principle behave differently in mo-
dal contexts.
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Up to now, we have used a proper name as primary test expression and a
description as expression for comparison. But now note that nothing hinders
us from applying the test in the reverse order, using a description as primary
test expression and a proper name as expression for comparison:
(3) The strange looking man might not have been the strange looking
man
(4) The strange looking man might not have been Jones
For illustration, we might sketch a corresponding scenario: The police find
an inscription in the sand reading “Jones” and they have no idea whoever
(or whatever) this might be. However, they notice a strange looking man
watching the scene from a distance. As soon as the man realizes that the po-
lice have spotted him he disappears in the crowd. Certainly, the strange be-
haviour of the man gives rise to some speculations. One officer says: “We
should have tried to catch the man. It might have been Jones.” The other re-
plies: “Don’t worry. He might as well not have been Jones.” Unbeknownst
to the policemen, however, the strange looking man actually was the person
referred to by the inscription in the sand. Given this, it is perhaps easier to
see that (3) and (4) can be used in a way such that they provide an instance
of the schemata (MS-1) and (MS-2) listed above.13 However plausible this
scenario might be, though, the essential point remains: if we submit these
sentences to the very same test conditions as the sentence pair (1)/(2) we
must conclude that the very same truth-value difference is found: If the de-
scription “the strange looking man” is used referentially for the same object
throughout the utterance, and if the name “Jones” is used attributively, and,
finally, if these expressions happen to apply to the same object then the ut-
terance of (3) comes out as false while (4) comes out as true.14 This result
now prompts the same sort of consideration as in the case of sentence pair
(1)/(2) albeit the other way round:
Where the first sentence contains a repeated occurrence of the description
“the strange looking man”, the second one contains a proper name naming
the very same person. But (3) and (4) differ in truth-value. This suggests
that we have a semantic difference—a difference in truth-value—caused by
variation within a modal context—the predicate “might not have been”.
Since (3) and (4) differ only with respect to the replacement of a description
with a proper name naming the same object, it is sensible to assume that this
semantic difference is caused by a semantic modal difference between the
description and the proper name. And since the expressions are co-
designative it is tempting to trace this difference back not to a difference
with respect to what they designate but to a difference in the way in which
they designate it. The description appears to call for a constant interpretation
even in modal contexts like “might (not) have been” while the proper name
seems not to demand this. Thus we arrive at a very unpleasant conclusion
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from the Kripkean point of view: The difference in truth-value of sentence
pairs like (3) and (4) illustrates that descriptions are modally rigid while
proper names are not.
6. Two morals
When applied in reverse order the test for rigidity derives a bizarre result.
Thus it casts doubt on the plausibility of the Kripkean case in the first place.
On the whole it seems that the considerations proposed neither succeed in
establishing the one claim nor the other. Given the reconstruction presented
it is easy to see the mechanisms responsible for this: The results obtained by
the application of the test depend only upon the order in which insertion
takes place and the way in which the expressions inserted are used. So there
is a negative conclusion to be drawn: the test can hardly demonstrate a se-
mantic modal asymmetry between proper names and descriptions since its
result depends on non-semantic features of the test conditions only. (We
might even substitute both α  and β  by co-designative descriptions (or co-
designative proper names) and we would still get the same result.)
Besides this negative conclusion, however, there is also a positive moral
to be drawn. Although the test does not demonstrate what the Kripkean
wants it still does establish a substantial point: Both proper names and de-
scriptions can be used in a way that constancy of interpretation concerning
the evaluation with respect to (alternative) possible worlds is required. We
may express this considerably shorter: the test shows that both proper names
and descriptions can be used rigidly. Roughly, an expression α  will be
used rigidly by x (with respect to a certain context of use U) if (with respect
to the communicative intentions of x as manifested in her usage of α  with
respect to U) it is used for the same object with respect to every (U-revelant)
circumstance of evaluation. Of course, this could be further explored. For
the time being, however, suffice it to say that in the light of the conse-
quences drawn the notion of rigidity does not cease to be important. So un-
like Kent Bach I do not regard rigidity as an illusion—even though I fully
subscribe to the following claim:
Kripke’s appeal to our intuitions about names may be compel-
ling, but I believe these intuitions have been misdescribed as
semantic and are properly understood as implicitly pragmatic.
(Bach 1994, 168)
In the present talk I have tried to make explicit in which sense the intuitive
argument is properly understood as appealing to pragmatic features. Actu-
ally, this seems to be an instance of a strategy once adopted by Robert Stal-
naker, namely “the general strategy […] to use pragmatic theory […] to take
some of the weight off semantic and syntactic theory.” (Stalnaker 1978,
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331). It seems that the behaviour of natural language expressions in modal
contexts lends itself neatly to an application of such a strategy.
7. An alternative focus?
I aimed at giving a strong and charitable reconstruction of the intuitive ar-
gument which is so vital for the Kripkean rigidity thesis. However, I ended
up with a critical analysis of that view. This might raise the issue of whether
the reconstruction given really was charitable enough. Let me come to a
close by taking up one possible worry.
Throughout my reconstruction I have been focussing on the contrast be-
tween the members of sentence pairs like (1)/(2):
(1) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle
(2) Aristotle might not have been the inventor of formal logic.
Still, one might be tempted to ask whether this really was the right focus.
An objector might wonder whether we had not better considered sentence
pairs like this one:
(1) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle
(5) The inventor of formal logic might not have been the inventor of
formal logic.
The objector might be inclined to argue in a first step that (1) has a true
reading while (5) has not and add in a second step that the (assumed) lack of
the true reading of the first indicates that the proper name “Aristotle” is a
rigid designator. Those sympathetic with objections of this kind will assume
that I have not accounted for sentence pairs of the latter type. But they face
at least two general questions. Does their move render the results of the re-
construction given above irrelevant? Does their move really introduce a new
perspective? I shall briefly indicate why I think that the answer to both of
these questions is no.
The envisaged strategy involves claiming that (5) is ambiguous. Since
there are two kinds of ambiguity, syntactic ambiguity and semantic (i.e.
lexical) ambiguity, we shall have to ask what kind of ambiguity is claimed
for (5). Is (5) said to be syntactically ambiguous or is its ambiguity derived
from a lexical ambiguity of its constituent expressions? Should the opponent
prefer syntactical ambiguity it is hard to see how his objection could not be
either ad hoc or an implicit appeal to a Russellian analysis of descriptions.
But the latter case was already discussed. Should the opponent prefer to
claim that (5) is ambiguous due to the lexical ambiguity of (one of) its con-
stituent expressions, however, there are two problems I would like to point
out. First of all, the likely constituent expression to be blamed for being am-
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biguous will be the description involved. But on this view it is hard to see
what advantage there is in focusing on pairs like (1)/(5) instead of pairs like
(1)/(2) for, clearly, if (5) is ambiguous because the description “the inventor
of formal logic” is, so is (2). Pairs of the latter type were already discussed,
though. Moreover, the advocate of the semantic ambiguity claim faces an-
other problem: What kind of systematic lexical ambiguity of descriptions
does he claim if not the assumed systematic ambiguity of descriptions used
referentially and descriptions used attributively? If this is what he resorts to
he will have to make a concession Kripke is not prepared to make. He will
have to subscribe to the view that the referential-attributive distinction is
semantically significant despite the fact that Kripke argues at length that it is
a pragmatic distinction. Against this background it seems clear that focusing
on pairs like (1)/(5) rather than pairs of the type I originally considered nei-
ther renders the reconstruction presented irrelevant nor introduces a new
perspective. We are simply referred back to the same issues discussed in the
original reconstruction.
8. Conclusion
What is the general impact of the investigation presented above? One way
of viewing it is that it measures the price we have to pay in order to stick to
the rigidity thesis. Understood as a thesis concerning the semantics of natu-
ral language expressions the rigidity thesis is not to be had without presup-
posing a Russellian analysis of descriptions or without assuming the seman-
tic significance of the referential-attributive distinction. For those of us who,
like Kripke, are not willing to pay this price the consequence is a different
one. It consists of regarding both the notion of rigidity and the test invoked
to attribute a given expression that property as pragmatically rather than se-
mantically relevant.
It is perhaps helpful to point out that this consequence is less threatening
than one might think. For instance, the application of quantified modal logic
to natural language is not at all revealed as dubious or even unwarranted.
What we might have to admit, though, is that in formalising our talk about
counterfactual situations some pragmatic features of this talk are being cap-
tured too. It may well be that Kripkeans will not admit this light-heartedly.
But then it is hard to see what relevance their talk of rigidity might have
with respect to natural language expressions.15
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Notes
1 In this talk, the distinctions between rigidity de jure and rigidity de facto
(Kripke 1980, 21) and between obstinately and persistently rigid desig-
nators (cf., e.g. Stanley 1997, 556) are deliberately neglected. Both these
distinctions are useful and important but since the considerations pre-
sented below do not direct their critical impetus against them I leave their
discussion for another occasion.
2 For this reason, I think that Jason Stanley’s approach in Section 4 of his
“Names and Rigid Designation” either falls short of being a reconstruc-
tion of the intuitive argument or does not, contrary to what he (1997,
565) suggests, depend upon the premise that variables under an assign-
ment are rigid designators.
3 It is clear that the predicate is complex and might well be further decom-
posed; it is far from clear, however, that this matters for the outcome of
the test.
4 Soames addresses the issue discussed here only in passing. He writes:
“Our ultimate ground for thinking that the name Aristotle is a rigid des-
ignator is our conviction that there is a certain individual x, such that for
every possible world w, the proposition that Aristotle was a philosopher
is true at w iff x was a philosopher at w, and similarly for other proposi-
tions.” (Soames 1998, 2) Unfortunately, the reconstruction he offers can
hardly claim to be modally innocent or intuitive. So it does not seem to
qualify as a reconstruction of the intuitive argument aimed at here.
5 Cf. Kripke 1980, 7. Also, cf. Cartwright (1997, 68): “Kripke intends the
thesis […] to be compatible with the fact that most proper names are
names of more than one thing. […] Indeed, Kripke’s entire discussion of
these matters proceeds under the simplifying assumption common in
philosophical discussions of reference, [that] no proper name designates
more that one thing.”
6 I take it to be a plausible requirement that the primary test expression is
to be used systematically, i.e. in the same way wherever it occurs, so I
ignore the possibility that the truth-value difference results from using it
once referentially and once attributively.
7 Let me briefly remind you of Donnellan’s classic example (1966, 285–6):
(i) Shocked by the brutal manner of the killing (but not knowing who did
the deed) we exclaim: “Smith’s murderer must be insane!” (ii) Watching
the trial against Jones (who is charged with murdering Smith) we sum up
our impression of his strange behaviour by saying “Smith’s murderer
must be insane!” The first case involves an attributive use of the descrip-
tion, the second its referential use. For Kripke’s view cf. Kripke 1977,
21. Note, however, that he tends to describe the attributive use of an ex-
pression in terms that easily suggest the mistaken view that using an ex-
pression attributively is a semantic usage rather than another pragmatic
one.
8 Cf. Russell’s emphasis in his 1918, 244: “I want you to realize that the
question whether a phrase is a definite description turns only upon its
form […].” Here, “form” is best understood as grammatical form. This is
also what Russell suggests elsewhere (1919, 168.) Note that pace Linsky
(1967, 62-63) we must not read “form” as “logical form” on pain of trivi-
alizing the Russellian analysis.
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9 Russell seems to impose this restriction because he takes expressions like
“the inhabitants of London” to stand for classes (1919, 181). But this is
not a good reason to exclude them since an expression like “the class of
inhabitants of London” surely qualifies as a description yet it stands for a
class and is grammatically singular. Quite generally, the singular-plural
distinction is irrelevant for grouping along syntactical (or logical) catego-
ries. Neither for being a proper name nor for being a general term nor for
being a quantifier is it a necessary condition to be grammatically singular
(or plural). If we want to treat descriptions grammatically (or logically)
on a par with expressions of these categories we must not subscribe to the
singularity restriction.
10 Cf. Abney 1987. In this talk, determiners are understood as elements of
the functional syntactic category DET consisting of the definite article
(“the”), the demonstrative determiner (“this”), and the determiner ele-
ment in genitive noun phrases (“Gray’s Elegy”) and possessive pronouns
(“my”). Noun phrases are taken to be phrases expanding roughly along
the following lines: NP → (AP) N (PP). For our present concern, lin-
guistic questions of the type of whether the determiner involved in de-
scriptions like “my only son” is the personal pronoun or the possessive
morpheme may safely be ignored.
11 Nor are we allowed to exclude generic descriptions (“the whale is a
mammal”). They do not seem to constitute a particular problem for the
Russellian analysis, though.
12 Cf. e.g. Sharvy 1980; Neale 1990.
13 It will not help to object that the modality involved in this story is per-
haps epistemic rather than metaphysic since this applies to sentence (2)
as well. Anyway, all that is required for the argument is that (4) and (3)
be interpreted in the same way as (1) and (2)—and this is surely possible.
14 Some theorists might be tempted to object that proper names cannot be
used other in another way than being used referentially. Kripke, however,
does not have such reservations: He holds that Donnellan’s distinction
does apply to proper names and that proper names can be used attribu-
tively (cf. e.g. Kripke 1980, 25 & 1977, 18.) Actually, there is nothing
mysterious about attributive uses of proper names. Think of a doctor at a
hospital scanning though some medical records. He may ask the nurse
“Who is Jones? Have I seen him before?” Is he using the proper name
referentially, as “merely one tool for doing a certain job” (to use Don-
nellan’s phrase), or attributively? Clearly, to assume the former is to ren-
der his question pointless.
15 Versions of his talk were presented to the research group “Attitudes,
Concepts, Objects” of the Doctoral Programme of Cognitive Science at
the University of Hamburg early in spring 1998 and to the Oxford
Graduate Conference in Fall 2000. I thank the participants of these
meetings, the participants of the present conference and some other
friends and colleagues for discussion, critical questions and helpful re-
marks. In particular, I am indebted to Kent Bach, Bill Brewer, Carola Es-
chenbach, Ben Hoefer, Andreas Kemmerling, Wolfgang Künne, Severin
Schroeder, Mark Siebel, Mark Textor and Timothy Williamson.
320
References
Abney, Stephen (1987): The English Noun Phrase in its Sentential Aspect.
Dissertation, The MIT.
Bach, Kent (1981): “Referential/Attributive”, Synthese 49, 219-244.
—— (1994): Thought and Reference, paperback edition: Clarendon Press.
Cartwright, Richard (1997): “On Singular Propositions”, in Ali Kazmi (ed.),
Meaning and Reference, Calgary 1998: University of Calgary Press, 68-
83.
Donnellan, Keith (1966): “Reference and Definite Descriptions”, The Philo-
sophical Review 75, 281-303.
Kripke, Saul (1977): “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference”, in
Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr. & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.),
Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, Minneapolis
1979: University of Minnesota Press, 6-27.
—— (1980): Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Linsky, Leonard (1967): Referring, London: Routledge Kegan & Paul.
Neale, Stephen (1990): Descriptions, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Russell, Bertrand (1905): “On Denoting”, Logic and Knowledge, edited by
Robert Charles Marsh. London 1956, 1989: Unwyn Hyman, 41-56.
—— (1910): “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Descrip-
tion”, Mysticism and Logic, London 1989: Unwyn, 200-221.
—— (1918): “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, Logic and Knowledge,
edited by Robert Charles Marsh. London 1989: Unwyn Hyman, 177-281.
—— (1919): Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, London 1995:
Routledge.
Sharvy, Richard (1980): “A More General Theory of Definite Descriptions”,
The Philosophical Review 89, 607-624
Soames, Scott (1998): “The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified
Descriptions”, Noûs 32, 1-22.
Stalnaker, Robert (1978): “Assertion”, Context and Content, Oxford 1999:
Oxford University Press, 78-95.
Stanley, Jason (1997): “Names and Rigid Designation”, in Robert Hale &
Crispin Wright (eds.), Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 555-585.
Ziff, Paul (1977): “About Proper Names”, Mind 86, 319-332.
